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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 After a jury awarded him $100,000 in punitive damages 
under the Pennsylvania Bad Faith Statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 8371, Appellant Bernie Clemens submitted a petition for 
over $900,000 in attorney’s fees from Appellee New York 
Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company (“NYCM”).  The 
District Court denied this petition in its entirety, reasoning that 
it was not adequately supported and that the requested amount 
was grossly excessive given the nature of the case.  Finding no 
abuse of discretion, we will affirm and, in doing so, take the 
opportunity to formally endorse a view already adopted by 
several other circuits—that is, where a fee-shifting statute 
provides a court discretion to award attorney’s fees, such 
discretion includes the ability to deny a fee request altogether 
when, under the circumstances, the amount requested is 
“outrageously excessive.”  Brown v. Stackler, 612 F.2d 1057, 
1059 (7th Cir. 1980); see also, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. 
Reilly, 1 F.3d 1254, 1258–60 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Fair Hous. 
Council of Greater Wash. v. Landow, 999 F.2d 92, 97 (4th Cir. 
1993); Lewis v. Kendrick, 944 F.2d 949, 956–58 (1st Cir. 
1991).    
I. BACKGROUND 
 Dissatisfied with NYCM’s handling of his insurance 
claim related to a serious car accident, Clemens filed suit 
against the company in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe 
County, asserting a contractual underinsured motorist (“UIM”) 
claim and a claim under the Bad Faith Statute, 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 8371.  After NYCM removed the case to federal court, 
the parties settled the UIM claim for $25,000.  The bad faith 
claim, meanwhile, proceeded to a week-long trial, at the 
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conclusion of which a jury found that NYCM had acted in bad 
faith in its handling of the insurance claim and awarded 
Clemens $100,000 in punitive damages.   
 As the prevailing party under the Bad Faith Statute, 
Clemens then submitted a petition for attorney’s fees, in which 
he requested an award of $946,526.43 in fees and costs.1  The 
District Court denied this request in its entirety, however.  In a 
thorough and well-reasoned one-hundred-page opinion, the 
court reviewed every time entry submitted, performed a 
traditional lodestar analysis, and concluded that eighty-seven 
percent of the hours billed had to be disallowed as vague, 
duplicative, unnecessary, or inadequately supported by 
documentary evidence.  In light of that substantial reduction, 
the District Court deemed Clemens’s request “outrageously 
excessive” and exercised its discretion to award no fee 
whatsoever.  App. 649.  Represented by new counsel, Clemens 
now appeals.2  
                                              
 1 Clemens’s petition also sought $175,630 in interest on 
his claims.  The District Court concluded that the Bad Faith 
Statute allowed Clemens to recover interest on only the 
$25,000 in UIM damages, though.  The court therefore 
awarded interest in the amount of $4,986.58.  Clemens does 
not appeal that determination.   
 2 Alone on the brief for Clemens in this Court is James 
C. Haggerty.  He did not enter an appearance in the District 
Court, and the record reveals no involvement on his part below.  
Lead counsel for Clemens in the District Court was Michael J. 




 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(a), and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
III. DISCUSSION 
 The Pennsylvania Bad Faith Statute provides that   
[i]n an action arising under an insurance policy, 
if the court finds that the insurer has acted in bad 
faith toward the insured, the court may take all of 
the following actions: 
(1) Award interest on the amount of the claim 
from the date the claim was made by the insured 
in an amount equal to the prime rate of interest 
plus 3%.  
(2) Award punitive damages against the insurer. 
(3) Assess court costs and attorney fees against 
the insurer.   
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8371.  Because the statute uses the word 
“may,” the decision to award attorney’s fees and costs “upon a 
finding of bad faith is wholly within the discretion of the trial 
court.”  Polselli v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 
524, 534 (3d Cir. 1997).  We will not disturb that decision 
absent an abuse of discretion.  Id. at 534 & n.13.3   
                                              
 3 Clemens argues that, because the Bad Faith Statute 
says that the court “may take all of the following actions,” 
rather than “may take any,” the award of attorney’s fees is 
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 In exercising their discretion under the statute, courts 
are guided by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1717, 
which provides that the relevant considerations include “the 
time and effort reasonably expended;” “the quality of the 
services rendered;” “the results achieved and benefits 
conferred upon the class or upon the public;” “the magnitude, 
complexity and uniqueness of the litigation;” and “whether the 
receipt of a fee was contingent on success.”  See Polselli, 126 
F.3d at 532 (discussing Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 
1716, which was subsequently renumbered as Rule 1717).   
 Like with federal fee-shifting statutes, the calculation of 
an attorney’s fee award under Rule 1717 begins with the 
lodestar method: the multiplication of the actual number of 
hours spent in pursuing the claim by a reasonable rate.4  Birth 
                                              
mandatory whenever punitive damages are awarded.  Even if 
we were to find this interpretation compelling, as it is a matter 
of state law, we look first to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 
which has rejected the argument, see Rancosky v. Wash. Nat’l 
Ins. Co., 170 A.3d 364, 376 (Pa. 2017).   
 4 Because the calculation of a fee award involves the 
lodestar method under both Rule 1717 and federal fee-shifting 
statutes, many of the decisions cited in the impending 
discussion involve federal fee-shifting statutes that, like the 
Pennsylvania Bad Faith Statute, leave the decision to award 
attorney’s fees and costs to the discretion of the trial court.  
Although the Bad Faith Statute differs from some of those 
federal statutes in that it does not expressly provide that the fee 
award must be “reasonable,” compare 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 8371 with, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) and 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(a)(4)(E), Rule 1717 effectively incorporates a 
reasonableness standard into the Bad Faith Statute by stating 
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Ctr. v. St. Paul Cos., Inc., 727 A.2d 1144, 1160–61 (Pa. Super. 
1999), abrogated on other grounds by Mishoe v. Erie Ins. Co., 
824 A.2d 1153, 1156–57 & n.3 (Pa. 2003); City of Burlington 
v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992) (“The ‘lodestar’ figure has, 
as its name suggests, become the guiding light of our fee-
shifting jurisprudence.”).   
 Under the lodestar method, “[t]he party seeking 
attorney’s fees has the burden to prove that its request . . . is 
reasonable.”  Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d 
Cir. 1990).  “When the applicant for a fee has carried [its] 
burden of showing that the claimed rates and number of hours 
are reasonable, the resulting product is presumed to be the 
reasonable fee to which counsel is entitled.”  Maldonado v. 
Houstoun, 256 F.3d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 
478 U.S. 546, 564 (1986)).  But courts “have a positive and 
affirmative function in the fee fixing process, not merely a 
passive role.”  Id.  “In calculating the hours reasonably 
expended, a court should ‘review the time charged, decide 
whether the hours set out were reasonably expended for each 
of the particular purposes described and then exclude those that 
are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.”’”  Id. 
(quoting Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. Windall, 
51 F.3d 1179, 1188 (3d Cir. 1995)).   
                                              
that “the time and effort reasonably expended” is a relevant 
consideration.  Thus, absent any indication that the standards 
guiding courts’ discretion are markedly different in the context 
of the Bad Faith Statute, we think decisions involving similar 
federal statutes are germane to our analysis.   
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 As noted above, the District Court’s lodestar calculation 
here reduced Clemens’s requested fee by eighty-seven percent.  
After making that reduction, the court then decided to award 
no fee at all in light of the excessive nature of the request.   
 Although it was unusual, we cannot say that this 
decision was an abuse of discretion.  Review of the record and 
the District Court’s comprehensive opinion makes clear that 
denial of a fee award was entirely appropriate under the 
circumstances of this case.  Counsel’s success at trial 
notwithstanding, the fee petition was severely deficient in 
numerous ways.   
 As a starting point, counsel did not maintain 
contemporaneous time records for most of the litigation.  
Instead, by their own admission, counsel “recreate[d]” all of 
the records provided as part of the fee petition, using an 
electronic case management system that did not keep track of 
the amount of time expended on particular tasks.  App. 503.  
Even worse, the responsibility of reconstructing the time 
records was left to a single attorney, who retrospectively 
estimated not only the length of time she herself had spent on 
each individual task, but also the amount of time others had 
spent on particular tasks, including colleagues who could not 
be consulted because they had left the firm by the time the fee 
petition was filed.5  We have never strictly required that fee 
                                              
 5 Astonishingly, counsel then attempted to recover 
attorney’s fees in the amount of $27,090 for the 64.5 hours it 
supposedly took to reconstruct the time records.  See App. 41, 
51.  The District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
disallowing those 64.5 hours altogether, as it is not NYCM’s 
9 
 
petitions be supported by contemporaneous records, but they 
have long been “the preferred practice.”  Keenan v. City of 
Phila., 983 F.2d 459, 472 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Webb v. Bd. 
of Educ. of Dyer Cty., 471 U.S. 234, 238 n.6 (1985)).  Thus, 
although reconstructed records in and of themselves do not 
justify complete disallowance of a fee award, they may warrant 
“more exacting scrutiny than we would bring to 
contemporaneous and detailed records.”  Grendel’s Den, Inc. 
v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 952 (1st Cir. 1984).   
 Here, it does not even require added scrutiny to discover 
further problems with the fee petition.  For one, many of the 
time entries submitted were so vague that there is no way to 
discern whether the hours billed were reasonable.  Counsel’s 
time records included, for instance, entries billing for attorney 
services described as “Other,” “Communicate,” or 
“Communicate-other.”  E.g., App. 327, 329, 336, 338, 342–43.  
Similarly, the fee petition included a number of entries for 
“Attorney review,” “Analysis/Strategy,” or “Review/analyze” 
with no additional explanation regarding the subject or 
necessity of the review.  E.g., App. 300–07, 331, 334–35, 338, 
347.  We are mindful of confidentiality obligations, but time 
entries still must “be specific enough to allow the district court 
to determine if the hours claimed are unreasonable for the work 
performed.”  Washington v. Phila. Cty. Ct. of Com. Pl., 89 F.3d 
1031, 1037 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Keenan, 983 F.2d at 472).  These entries, as well as 
many others, were nowhere near specific enough.   
                                              
responsibility to pay for the consequences of counsel’s own 
neglect.   
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 In addition to the vague entries, some entries were, on 
their face, unnecessary or excessive.  For example, over the 
course of one week, and at the same time counsel were billing 
for trial preparation, counsel billed a total of sixty-four hours 
for “Transcripts/clips.”  See App. 360.  Whatever this means, 
we are confident that it was not necessary to spend sixty-four 
hours on it given the straightforward nature of the case.  Of a 
similar vein are the frequent entries that requested attorney 
rates for “File maintenance,” “File management,” and 
“Document management,” e.g., App. 330–34, 336, 338–42, 
some of which were for as long as seven hours in a single day.  
App. 333, 336.  Without more information, these tasks appear 
“purely clerical” in nature and should not be billed at a 
lawyer’s rate—nor for many hours at a time.  Missouri v. 
Jenkins ex rel. Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 (1989).   
 Then there are the staggering 562 hours that counsel 
billed for “Trial prep” or “Trial preparation” with no further 
description of the nature of the work performed.  See App. 
358–63.  We agree with the District Court that this is an 
“outrageous” number under the circumstances.  App. 630.  As 
the District Court put it, “[i]f counsel did nothing else for eight 
hours a day, every day, [562 hours] would mean that counsel 
spent approximately 70 days doing nothing but preparing for 
trial in this matter.”  App. 630.  Yet the trial consisted of only 
four days of substantive testimony, and involved a total of only 
five witnesses for both sides.  The sole issue was whether 
NYCM had acted in bad faith in its handling of Clemens’s UIM 
claim.  Counsel certainly have an obligation to be prepared, but 
we simply cannot fathom how they could have reasonably 
spent such an astronomical amount of time preparing for trial 
in this case, and we highly doubt they would have billed their 
own client for all of the hours claimed, see Maldonado, 256 
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F.3d at 184 (“Hours that would not generally be billed to one’s 
own client are not properly billed to an adversary.” (quoting 
Pub. Interest Research Grp., 51 F.3d at 1188)).   
 All the more troubling is the fact that counsel’s 
(supposedly) hard work did not appear to pay off at trial.  As 
the District Court explained, counsel had “to be repeatedly 
admonished for not being prepared because he was obviously 
unfamiliar with the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and the rulings of th[e] court.”  App. 
630 (emphasis omitted).  Given counsel’s subpar performance 
and the vagueness and excessiveness of the time entries, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing all 562 
hours.   
 Aside from the problems with the hours billed for 
individual tasks, counsel also neglected their burden of 
showing that their requested hourly rates were reasonable in 
light of the prevailing rates “in the community for similar 
services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, 
experience, and reputation.”  Maldonado, 256 F.3d at 184 
(quoting Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183).  Indeed, counsel bore “the 
burden of establishing by way of satisfactory evidence, in 
addition to [their] own affidavits, . . . that the requested hourly 
rates [met] this standard.”  Id. (omission in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Washington, 89 F.3d at 
1035).  Here, the five billing attorneys did not even submit their 
own affidavits identifying their usual billing rates or describing 
their levels of experience.  And only one of the five attorneys 
testified at the hearing on the fee petition about her background 
and experience.  Thus, for four of the five billing lawyers, 
including lead trial counsel, the District Court was provided no 
information whatsoever on which it could make a 
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determination as to whether the requested hourly rate was 
reasonable.   
 The District Court would have liked to disallow any 
hours billed by those four lawyers, see App. 646–47, and it 
would have been within the court’s discretion to do so.  But the 
court was not able to because the fee petition did not indicate 
which attorney performed each particular task.  The District 
Court therefore disallowed all hours billed prior to the one 
testifying lawyer’s arrival at the firm, those billed for multiple 
attorney “roundtables,” and all trial hours billed by more than 
one lawyer.  App. 647 n.62.  Other than those hours, however, 
the court gave counsel the “benefit of the doubt” and assumed 
that the one testifying lawyer had performed all of the hours 
billed after she had joined the firm that had not already been 
disallowed for some other independent reason.  App. 646.   
 As a result, the District Court’s lodestar calculation, if 
anything, overestimated the amount of hours to which counsel 
were entitled.  And still, the court concluded—based on the 
disallowances described above, as well as other reductions—
that counsel were entitled to only thirteen percent of the fees 
they requested.  The court thus found the request “outrageously 
excessive” and exercised its discretion to award no fee at all.  
App. 649.  
 Although we have never had the opportunity to formally 
endorse such an approach, other circuits have, holding that 
district courts have the discretion to deny a fee request in its 
entirety when the requested amount is “outrageously 
excessive” under the circumstances.  Brown v. Stackler, 612 
F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1980); see also, e.g., Scham v. 
District Courts Trying Criminal Cases, 148 F.3d 554, 556–59 
(5th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in 
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Bailey v. Mississippi, 407 F.3d 684, 686–87 (5th Cir. 2005); 
Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Reilly, 1 F.3d 1254, 1258–60 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993); Fair Hous. Council of Greater Wash. v. Landow, 
999 F.2d 92, 97 (4th Cir. 1993); Lewis v. Kendrick, 944 F.2d 
949, 956–58 (1st Cir. 1991).6   
 Underlying these decisions is the idea that if courts did 
not possess this kind of discretion, “claimants would be 
encouraged to make unreasonable demands, knowing that the 
only unfavorable consequence of such conduct would be 
reduction of their fee to what they should have asked for in the 
first place.”  Landow, 999 F.2d at 96 (quoting Stackler, 612 
F.2d at 1059).  We find this rationale persuasive.  When a party 
submits a fee petition, it is not the “opening bid in the quest for 
an award.”  Id. at 97 (citing Kendrick, 944 F.2d at 98).  Rather, 
it is the duty of the requesting party to “make a good faith effort 
to exclude . . . hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise 
unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is 
obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission.”  
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983).   
 Here, the District Court provided a thorough 
explanation of how counsel failed to fulfill their duty to the 
court.  This failure, coupled with the other deficiencies in the 
petition and counsel’s substandard performance, justified the 
District Court’s decision to deny the fee request in its entirety.  
That decision was not an abuse of discretion.   
                                              
 6 These decisions involve federal fee-shifting statutes, 
but for the reasons provided above, see supra note 4, we think 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court.   
